




IS A CURE ON THE WAY? – THE BAD MEDICINE OF GENERICS, 
















Over the next five years, approximately 110 drugs, including blockbuster products such 
as Sanofi-Aventis‟ allergy medicine Flomax, GlaxoSmithKline‟s herpes medication 
Valtrex, and Pfizer‟s cholesterol medication Lipitor will lose their patent protection.
1
  In 
2009 alone, brand-name drugs coming off patent were valued at more than 10.8 billion 
dollars.
2
  As market exclusivity for these drugs ends, the doors for generic production 
will open.  Generic drugs generally enter the market priced 20 to 80 percent lower than 
their branded counterparts, and generics can capture 44 to 80 percent of brand-name drug 
sales within a year after release.
3
  This price competition from generic drugs threatens the 
profits
 
of brand-name manufacturers and reduces their returns on innovative
 
activity.  As 
a result, some brand-name drug manufacturers have resorted to aggressive tactics to blunt 
the impact
 
of competition.  
 
One strategy that has received considerable scrutiny by administrative agencies and the 
courts is the aggressive petitioning activities of brand-name drug manufacturers.
4
  The 
concern is that these companies are abusing the government process by filing baseless 
petitions with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order to extend artificially 
their monopolies.
5
  The effectiveness of this strategy lies in the inherent tension between 
a citizen‟s First Amendment right to petition the government and antitrust laws designed 
to prohibit anticompetitive economic behavior.
6
  Historically, courts and government 
enforcement agencies have relied on a trilogy of cases collectively known as the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and its “sham exception” corollary to lessen that tension and curb 
abuse.
7
   
 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine requires courts to interpret the fundamental antitrust law 
known as the Sherman Antitrust Act in a way that safeguards the government‟s ability to 




  Grounded in the First Amendment, the doctrine immunizes 
from liability conduct aimed at persuading the government.
9
  While expansive, the 
doctrine is not absolute.  The “sham exception” provides that a petition loses immunity if 
it is objectively baseless and born of a predatory intent that is “actually nothing more than 
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.” 
10
   
  
However, the sham exception‟s “objectively baseless” requirement has been an 
insurmountable obstacle to courts‟ effective policing of brand-name manufacturer‟s 
anticompetitive conduct.  In an effort to fill the void, Congress recently passed legislation 
to reform the FDA‟s review of citizen petitions and generic drug applications.  
Notwithstanding these efforts, brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers have stymied 
the effective application of the sham exception and FDA regulations.  
 
This Article explores the regulatory and adjudicatory impact of brand-name drug 
manufacturers‟ use of governmental processes to delay the availability of generic drugs.
11
  
In the current environment, brand-name drug manufacturers can engage in a two-tiered 
approach to extend their market share with little fear of facing antitrust liability.  On the 
administrative agency level, it is possible for manufacturers to file baseless petitions that 
can halt a generic drug‟s approval for six months or longer.  After the FDA has 
determined that the petition is meritless, then on the judicial level, these manufacturers 
have been able to avoid antitrust liability by relying on Noerr-Pennington immunity.  
While this Article recommends a robust application of the sham exception, even a 
reconfigured Noerr-Pennington doctrine cannot provide a complete solution.  This 
Article argues that to curb effectively this type of abuse, the solution must include 
adequate agency reforms.  The Federal Drug Administration Revitalization Act of 2007 
(FDARA) is an initial step in that direction.   This article suggests ways to build on that 





Given the unique regulatory framework for encouraging the development and market 
introduction of generic drugs, Part I of this Article provides an overview of the generic 
drug industry.  The first section describes the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, the legislation 
that modified antitrust laws to enable production of generic drugs.   In the next section, 
the Article describes the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process for generic 
drugs.    
 
Part II describes the original intent behind the establishment of the citizen petition 
process and its role in generic drug approvals.  This section also discusses how FDA 
regulations and policies allow some brand-name drug manufacturers to manipulate this 
process.  Part III of the Article examines the trilogy of cases that define the basic 
parameters and principles of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.  This section also focuses on 
the two-part inquiry that courts rely on to determine applicability of the “sham 
exception”.  In particular, the Article comments on the difficulty courts have had in 
policing the conduct of defendant manufacturers accused of filing petitions that are both 
“objectively baseless” and born of predatory intent in the pharmaceutical industry 
context.   As part of that examination, this Article analyzes Louisiana Wholesale Drug 
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Co. v. Aventis Pharmaceutical, Inc. a recent federal appellate court opinion. 
13
  This case 
illustrates that even after an FDA determination that a petition is baseless and without 
legal merit, it is still possible for a court to hold that the facts are insufficient to meet 
“sham exception” criteria.    This Article posits that the Louisiana Wholesale case is 
significant because it strongly suggests that under courts‟ current interpretation of the 
sham exception, regardless of the facts and agency determinations, the filing of baseless 
citizen petitions to prevent competition will remain immune from liability. 
 
Finally, Part IV considers other alternatives aimed at making it unattractive for 
pharmaceutical manufacturers‟ to attempt to abuse the citizen petition process. These 
alternatives include regulatory and procedural reforms that build on the recently passed 
FDARA citizen petition provisions.  These proposals enable the FDA to respond more 
directly and effectively to anticompetitive abuses of the regulatory process.  In addition, 
the Article recommends ways for courts to incorporate FDA citizen petition 
determinations when  evaluating the “objectively baseless” prong of the sham exception.  
The goal of these proposals is to strike an appropriate balance between preserving the 
intent of citizen petitions and maintaining a regulatory pathway for generic drugs to enter 
the market that is unimpeded by bad-faith barriers.   
  
Part I - Origins of the Generic Drug Industry – Hatch-Waxman and the Generic 
Drug Approval Process 
 
Consumers benefit greatly from the availability of generic drugs.
14
  According to the 
Congressional Budget Office, generic drugs save consumers on average 8 to 10 billion 
dollars a year.
15
   In 2009, generic drugs filled over sixty percent of all prescriptions 
written.
16
  As the patents for more brand-name drugs expire, industry experts expect that 
percentage to rise.
17
  Brand-name manufacturers rely on the exclusive rights to market 
their drugs for their revenue.   For example, in 2001 when Eli Lilly‟s patent expired on its 
blockbuster drug Prozac, the company‟s annualized revenues from the drug went from 
2.7 billion to 1.8 billion in nine months.
18
    With so much at stake, it is not surprising that 
some brand-name manufacturers have resorted to filing petitions of questionable 
legitimacy with the FDA to delay generic drug approvals and artificially extend their 
market share.
19
   
 
A. Pre Hatch-Waxman Landscape  
 
To fully grasp how and why the drug industry is particularly vulnerable to these 
petitioning actions that threaten competition, a brief discussion of the unique regulatory 
structure governing the pharmaceutical industry is required.   In 1962, Congress amended 
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)
 
to require drug manufacturers 
wishing to sell new pharmaceuticals to file a New Drug Application (NDA) to “prove the 
new drugs are safe and effective prior to FDA approval.”
 20
  Preparing such an 
application was, and is, a time consuming and expensive process that must contain 
studies of the drug‟s chemistry, manufacturing information, patents and labeling.
21
  After 
completing the NDA, a team of FDA toxicologists, physicians, chemists and 
microbiologists reviews the application.
22
  The time and expense associated with gaining 
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FDA approval provided little incentive for a generic drug maker, who had to “re-prove” 
what the brand-name drug companies had already established, to enter the market.
23
 
Between 1962 and 1984, 150 drugs went off patent with no generic equivalent.
24
 As a 
result, a brand-name drug company retained de facto control over the market long after 
its patent term.
25
   The lack of competition kept the cost of drugs to consumers high.
26
   
 
Patent restrictions were another disincentive for generic manufacturers to enter the 
market.  In Roche Prods., v. Bolar Pharm. Co., the court held that a generic drug 
company could not test or begin the clinical trial process required for FDA approval until 
after the brand-name drug company's patent expired.
27
  As a result, there was 




In an effort to construct legislation enabling generics reach the market faster, Congress 
unintentionally created another problem.  A brand-name company typically requires 
between eight to ten years to prepare an NDA and obtain FDA approval.
29
  Companies 
however, were often required to file for the patent before conducting the required clinical 
trials necessary for FDA approval.
30
    As a result, the patent clock began immediately 
and continued to run throughout the entire FDA approval process, which often took place 
after patent acquisition.
31
  Increasing the speed and time associated with bringing 
generics to market threatened brand-name manufacturers‟ ability to recoup research and 
development costs lost while they were awaiting pre-market FDA approval.
32
 
Accordingly, if Congress was to provide cheaper pharmaceuticals for consumers through 
the availability of generic drugs, it also needed to provide brand-name manufacturers‟ 
incentive to invest in new drug innovation through patent extensions.  
B. Pharmaceutical Drugs in the Hatch-Waxman Act Era  
  
Congress‟ resolution of these conflicting goals was the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to 
the FDCA or simply the Hatch-Waxman Act.
33
  The goal of the Act was to strike a 
balance between brand-name manufacturers‟ desire to bring new drugs to market with 
adequate patent protection and generic drug manufacturer‟s desire for an approval 
process that enables them to compete with brand-name manufacturers by marketing 
generic versions of brand-name drugs. 
34
  In terms of regulatory reforms benefitting 
brand-name drug manufacturers, to encourage companies to continue to develop new 
drugs, the Act extended patents to compensate for time lost during the FDA approval 
process.
35
  As a result, the Act provided brand-name manufacturers patent extensions of 
up five years with total exclusivity time not exceeding fourteen years.
36
 Congress also 
addressed delays and uncertainties in the drug approval process for brand-name and 
generic drugs alike.
37
  In addition, the Act created a process that would enable generic 
drugs to enter the market faster.
38
    
 
Since the Act‟s passage in 1984, the pharmaceutical drug landscape has changed 
dramatically.   At that time, generic drugs filled 19 percent of prescriptions.
39
   Since the  
Hatch-Waxman Act‟s enactment, generic drugs have tripled in terms of drug volume.
40
  
In addition, generic drug prescriptions now exceed brand-name drug prescriptions, and 




  Finally, the number of companies providing generic has also 
expanded since the creation of the Act.
42
  
    
 
1. Generics - Abbreviated New Drug Applications  
To enable generics to reach the market sooner, the Act made substantial changes to the 
FDA‟s process for approving generic drugs.  The first change was to revise the 
applicability of patent law on generic drug formulations.  The Act permits generic 
manufacturers to begin experiments on a patent drug prior to its expiration.
43
  In what is 
referred to as the “Bolar Exemption”,
44
 Congress specifically defined a generic 
manufacture‟s use of clinical information already in a NDA as a “non-infringing use” as 
long as the purpose is solely for obtaining FDA approval.
45
   This statutory exemption 




The second major regulatory change allowed generic drug manufacturers to file 
Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) rather than an NDA for FDA approval
47
.   
This streamlined process allows generic manufacturers to “piggyback on proprietary 
safety and effectiveness data submitted by the innovator to obtain approval from the 
[FDA] for the pioneer drug.”
48
  This process substantially relaxed the regulatory testing 
requirements for generics and thereby increased competition in the drug market.
49
  By 
avoiding the costly and time consuming expense of generating safety and efficacy data, 
generic companies avoid sizable research and development costs and are able to market 




2. The Generic Drug Approval Process 
 
The generic drug development process begins by identifying a brand-name drug whose 
patent is due to expire within three to five years.
51
  A generic drug company next submits 
an ANDA to the FDA in accordance with the statutory criteria.
52
  These criteria require 
an ANDA to demonstrate that the generic drug is bioequivalent to a previously approved 
drug on the market.
53
  Specifically, the generic company must then show that the drug 
specified in the ANDA is the same in terms of active ingredients, dosage form, strength, 
and route of administration.
54
  The generic manufacturer must also meet the same 
standards for manufacturing practices, identity, strength, quality and purity as the 
approved manufacturer.
55
  In addition, the labeling standards must contain the same 
information as its brand-name counterpart. ANDA applications satisfy the FDA‟s safety 
and efficiency requirements through bioequivalence studies that are a fraction of the cost 
of a larger clinical study.
56
     
 
Congress intended that the bioequivalence requirement would ensure FDA approval only 
of a generic drug that is therapeutically equivalent to its brand-name counterpart.
57
  These 
evaluations are contained in a book the FDA publishes annually entitled Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations also commonly referred to as the 
“Orange Book”.
58
  The FDA updates this book monthly and lists information on more 
than 6,000 approved drug products that it considers therapeutic substitutes for each 
other.
59
 The book also contains lists of generic products that have not had their 





Providing there are no challenges, the generic approval process takes between three to 
five years. 
61
  The cost to a generic drug manufacturer is substantially less than that of a 
brand-name manufacturer.
62
  Once the FDA approves an ANDA, the generic drug 
company receives an exclusive 180-day period during which no other generic company 
can market a generic version of that drug. 
63
   
 
When a generic manufacturer submits an ANDA, it must also certify one of the following 
for each of its generic versions of the drug listed in the Orange Book: (1) no such patent 
information has been submitted to the FDA; (2) its patent has expired; (3) the patent is set 
to expire on a certain date; or (4) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, sale, or use of the generic drug for which the ANDA has been submitted.
64
  
These are commonly referred to as Paragraph I, II, III, and IV certifications.
65
  The FDA 
oversees the first three certifications while the courts administer the fourth certification 
because it necessitates a determination of whether the generic drug infringes a validly 
patented drug.
66
  If a generic manufacturer asserts a Paragraph I or II certification, the 
FDA may automatically approve the application.
67
  If an ANDA application claims a 
Paragraph III certification, the FDA will not approve the generic drug‟s application until 




3. Paragraph IV Certifications  
 
To increase competition, the Hatch-Waxman Act encourages generic manufacturers to 
challenge the validity of the brand-name drug‟s patent by filing a Paragraph IV 
certification.
69
  Under the Act, generic manufacturers who challenge an active patent 
must give notice to the brand-name patent holder within twenty days of filing.
70
  The 
notice must include the legal and factual grounds underlying the manufacturer‟s assertion 
that its drug does not infringe the patent or that the patent is not valid.
71
  Paragraph IV 
certifications are approved immediately unless the patent holder files an infringement 
action in district court within forty-five days of receiving notice.
72
  If suit is filed, the 
generic application is automatically stayed for thirty months, unless one of the following 
events occurs first: (1) the patent expires; (2) the court renders a final determination of 
non-infringement or (3) the court determines the patent invalid.
73
  Any final court ruling 
within the thirty-month stay that upholds a Paragraph IV certification will include the 
ANDA approval date.
74
  During the forty-five day period that the patent holder can file an 
infringement action, the ANDA applicant cannot file a declaratory judgment action 
regarding the patent issue.
75
   
 
The Act also provides that the first ANDA applicant to file a Paragraph IV certification 
receives a 180-day period of marketing exclusivity.
76
 As originally enacted, Hatch-
Waxman required a generic manufacture to successfully defend its Paragraph IV 
certification before being granted the 180-day exclusivity period.  In 2007, however, 
Congress removed this requirement.
77
 Throughout the length of the exclusivity period, 
the FDA will not approve a subsequent generic‟s ANDA application for the same 
product. 
78
  During this time, the only competition that the generic drug has is the higher 
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priced brand-name drug.  Generics, therefore, have a financial interest in challenging the 




4. Abuses of Governmental Processes 
 
By striking a balance between the interests of the brand-name and generic drug makers, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to be a practical approach to providing the best and 
most cost-efficient medicines for American consumers.
80
  In practice, however, brand-
name drug manufacturers often manipulated provisions of the Act to extend artificially 
their monopolies. According to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), brand-name 
manufacturers have exploited the Hatch-Waxman Act and governmental processes to the 
detriment of generic manufacturers and consumers.
81
  Though beyond the scope of this 
article, some of these abuses include: (1) improper Orange Book listing of invalid 
patents;
82
 (2) filing patents late to secure a 30 month stay;
83
 (3) use of the 180-day 
exclusivity period to prevent generic marketing;
84
 (4) payments to generic manufacturers 
to postpone market entry of their approved drugs,
85
 and (5) obtaining exclusive licensing 
agreements related to a patent. 
86
  Another area in which brand-name drug manufacturers 
exploit the Act, as well as governmental processes, is through the filing of “sham” citizen 
petitions with the FDA.  To understand fully what makes this particular strategy so 
effective, a brief review of the constitutional origins of citizen petitions is necessary.    
 
Part II – Citizen Petitions  
 
In 1975, the Administrative Procedures Act created the ability for citizens, including drug 
manufacturers, to petition the FDA.
 87
    The intent of the Act was to correct the absence 
of a form or procedure for individuals to exercise their First Amendment right.
88
  The Act 
requires that every agency provide the public with the right to petition for the issuance, 
amendment, or repeal of a rule.
89
  As applied to the FDA, it guarantees citizens the right 
to contact the agency to “issue, amend, or revoke” a regulation or order.
90
  As originally 
enacted, citizen petitions were designed to benefit the FDA and public by giving 
individuals a formal means to influence the FDA‟s regulations on matters of health and 
safety.
91
   
 
From the outset, individuals used citizen petitions to contact the FDA on a broad range of 
health and safety issues ranging from a food trade association‟s request that the Agency 
establish exemptions from certain package labeling requirements to a consumer group‟s 
request that the FDA increase regulation of certain products like tobacco.
92
  The 1984 
passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act expanded the health and safety concerns of citizen 
petitions to include the ANDA generic drug process.
93
  For the first time, the public‟s 
right to request the FDA to “issue, amend, or revoke” a regulation or order applied to the 
Agency‟s approving or denying standards for ANDAs.
 94
    
 
The dual responsibilities of the FDA to approve ANDAs and review citizen petitions 
have created a two-tier opportunity to delay the introduction of a generic drug through an 
abuse of governmental processes.  First Amendment protections inherent in citizen 
petitions provide brand-name manufacturers an effective vehicle to file citizen petitions 
with virtual impunity.  The combination of FDA regulations, procedures, and limited 
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Agency resources creates an opportunity to use objectively baseless claims to halt ANDA 
approvals mid-stream.   When generic manufacturers challenge these anti-competitive 
tactics in court, brand-name manufacturers avail themselves of the protection of the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine that immunizes these actions under the First Amendment.  
What follows is a discussion on how this is possible.  
  
Scope of the Citizen Petition   
 
A. The FDA’s Citizen Petition Process  
 
Filing a citizen petition is the first administrative step toward resolving a health and 
safety concern with the FDA.
95
  Petitions must state the action requested, the grounds, 
and the environmental impact of the request. 
96
  In addition, the petitioner submits all 
data, information, and views that form the basis of the petition.  To ensure a balanced and 
reasonable presentation, citizen petitions also include a representative set known by the 
petitioner of unfavorable data.
97
   
  
Citizens can submit petitions at any time.
98
  However, the FDA reports an increasing 
tendency to receive citizen petitions from brand-name manufacturers dealing with “health 
and safety” concerns about a pending generic‟s ANDA on the eve of their product‟s 
patent expiration.
99
  Though not required, until recently the FDA automatically 
suspended ANDA approval until all the issues in a citizen petition were resolved.
100
  Due 
to the sharp increase in the number of petition filings and the FDA‟s limited staff, review 




After receipt, the FDA categorizes petitions by whether they raise scientific or legal 
concerns.
102
  Citizen petitions raising scientific issues generally challenge the 
bioequivalence standards.
103
  Recent legal issues have included petitions directed towards 
the ANDA approval process itself, fundamental requirements for a generic drug patent 
certification and ANDA applicants, and areas of exclusivity.
104
   The category of subject 
matter, availability of agency resources, and statutory time requirements determine the 
priority of the FDA‟s response to the petition.
105
   
 
The FDA can approve a citizen petition,
106
 deny the petition,
107
 or provide a tentative 
response
108
 indicating why the Agency has been unable to reach a decision on the petition 
within the required 180-day response period.  If the FDA denies the brand-name 
manufacturer‟s petition, or does not respond in a timely manner, the manufacturer can 
file a lawsuit for both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the Agency.
109
   
 
B. The First Benefit of Filing Sham Petitions: “Delayed Generic Competition” 
 
Concern over the FDA‟s administration of its citizen petition review process is long 
standing.
110
  In 1999, the Agency issued a proposed rule to address questions that had 
“arisen [regarding] whether a citizen petition can be used for improper purposes such as 
delaying competition . . . or delaying agency action.”
111
 In particular, the Agency 
acknowledged growing concerns regarding “generic blocking petitions.”
112
  The proposed 
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rule identified several options to reduce backlog, address frivolous petitions and protect 
the integrity of the process.
113
   Four years later, however, the Agency withdrew the 





The FDA‟s decision not to reform its petition process had a significant impact on the 
changing pharmaceutical industry and the Agency‟s effectiveness.  The advent of the 
streamlined generic drug approval process and the expiration of brand-name drug patents 
increased the number of ANDAs, and correspondingly, the number of citizen petitions 
the FDA received.
115
  For example, during the five-year period between 2001 and 2006, 
the number of ANDAs submitted to the FDA‟s Office of Generic Drugs increased 150 
percent.
116
  During roughly the same period, the FDA experienced nearly a two-fold 
increase in the of number citizen petitions.
117
  By 2006, ANDAs were the subject of 
approximately one-third of all citizen petitions filed with the FDA.
118
  By 2008, the 





Echoing concerns expressed five years prior, the FDA indicated that numerous petitions 
were of dubious merit and appeared to be nothing more than attempts by brand-name 
manufacturers to exploit the Agency‟s processes to extend artificially the period of their 
drug‟s market exclusivity.
120
  As noted by former FDA Chief Counsel Sheldon Bradshaw 
a number of the petitions filed were “not designed to raise timely concerns with respect to 
legality or scientific soundness of approving a drug application, but rather to delay 
approval by compelling the Agency to review arguments that could have been made 
months before.”
 121
   Between 2003 and 2006, the FDA ruled on 21 citizen petitions.
122
  
The Agency determined that all but one of the petitions lacked merit.
123
  Moreover, ten of 
those filings were identified as “eleventh hour petitions” – submitted within six months 
of the anticipated entry date of the generic drug.
124
  None of those eleventh-hour petitions 
was found to raise a meritorious health or safety concern.
125
  Between 2000 and 2005, the 
FDA dismissed seventy-six percent of the petitions it reviewed for lack of merit.
126
   
 
In response to these types of abuses, in 2007, Congress amended the FDCA to limit the 
adverse impact of citizen petitions on the generic drugs.
 127
   The FDA is required to 
resolve citizen petitions within six months of receipt.
128
  The Agency also will not delay 
approval of an ANDA because of a citizen petition unless delay is necessary to protect 
the public health.
129
  If the FDA decides to stay an ANDA, the Agency will notify the 
applicant within thirty days of that determination.
130
  In addition, the regulations require 
all citizen petitions to be signed and contain attestations that all relevant information is 
included.
131
  Moreover, the regulations include a provision specifically addressing 
delaying or blocking petitions.
132
   A petition that is submitted for the primary purpose of 
delaying an ANDA, and that on its face raises no valid regulatory or scientific issues, can 




In 2008, a bipartisan group from both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate 
expressed concerns that notwithstanding the new regulations, abuses continued because 
the FDA was not moving aggressively enough to implement the new law.
134
  Shortly 
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afterward, the FDA issued draft Guidance for Industry Citizen Petitions and Petitions for 
Stay of Action Subject to 505(q) and the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.
 135
   While not 
binding, the draft guidance expounds on current Agency thinking and illustrates how it 
intends to implement the citizen petition reforms.
 136
 Two recent cases make clear that 
despite regulatory reforms and the recent Agency guidance, abuses of government 
processes involving the FDA‟s regulatory procedures are still possible.  
 
In a recent case, In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, Anchen Pharmaceuticals 
(“Anchen”) and other drug wholesalers filed a class action lawsuit against pharmaceutical 
manufacturers GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) and Biovail Corporation (“Biovail”).
137
  In the 
complaint, Anchen alleged that GSK and Biovail conspired to delay improperly the sale 
of generic versions of the brand-name antidepressant Wellbutrin XL by filing a sham 
citizen petition with the FDA. 
138
  In November 2005, the FDA approved Anchen‟s 
ANDA for a generic version of Wellbutrin XL.
139
   Because of ongoing patent 
infringement litigation, however, Anchen was not able to manufacturer or market its 
product at that time.
140
  Approximately one month later, Biovail filed a citizen petition 
with the FDA requesting that all ANDA applications, include additional bioequivalence 
studies that were contrary to the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and the FDA's 
protocols.
141
  It took the FDA more than a year to rule on and subsequently deny GSK 
and Biovail‟s citizen petitions.
142
  Annual sales of Wellbutrin XL exceeded $1.8 billion a 
year.
143
  Every month the FDA spent reviewing Biovail‟s meritless petition, generic 
products were denied market entry and Biovail and GSK earned more than a billion 
dollars in revenues from consumers and direct purchasers.
144
   
At issue in Roxane Laboratories v. GlaxoSmithKline, currently awaiting trial in a 
Pennsylvania federal district court, are a series of citizen petitions GSK submitted to the 
FDA.
145
  In 2004, as the end of GSK's exclusivity period for Flonase approached, GSK 
filed four successive citizen petitions.
146
  These petitions requested that the FDA 
“establish a complete and methodology” for flonase before approving an ANDA.
147
   In 
denying this request, the Agency noted that neither the Act nor regulation require the 
FDA to issue final guidance before approving an ANDA.
148
   In addition, the FDA noted 
the GSK failed to provide any authority its request.
149
  The FDA also found that GSK‟s 
assertion that in vitro tests required use of a geometric mean methodology “irrelevant.”
150
   
 
In denying GSK‟s motion to stay, the FDA found GSK‟s justification that it needed the 
stay because “the balance of equities” will shift to GSK‟s detriment once generics are 
approved for marketing unpersuasive.
151
   The FDA concluded that the policies of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act dictate that GSK “not be permitted to shield its market share when 
the Agency has reasonably determined that competing generic drug products may be 
approved under section 505(j) of the Act.”
152
   The filing and FDA review of GSK‟s 




These two recent cases raise questions as to whether the recently enacted FDAAA will 
prevent brand-name manufacturers from improperly delaying generics from entering the 
market.  As indicated in the “2009 FDAAA Implementation – Highlights Two Year 
Implementation” the Agency acknowledged that it failed to respond to all citizen 
petitions for that year within the regulatory timeframe.
154
  In addition, neither the draft 
 11 
guidance nor the new regulations contain provisions to address repetitive filings such as 
those at issues in in re Wellbutrin XL Litigation, misrepresentations or petitions 
containing fraudulent claims.  In addition, neither the regulations nor the draft guidance 
defines what criteria the FDA uses to determine “intent to delay” petitions.
155
  The FDA 
also indicates that its failure to respond to a citizen petition within the required 180 days 
is not a petition denial, but a “final agency action”.
156
  The regulations, however, fail to 
clarify what this means for challenging such a “final agency action”.  In addition, the 
regulations fail to specify the types of health or safety concerns that would require 
staying the ANDA.
157
   Finally, the regulations and draft guidance fail to detail sanctions 
or penalties for submitting delaying or fraudulent petitions. As a result, filing sham 
petitions remains a relatively cost and risk free strategy for brand-name manufacturers to 
retain market share.  
 
III. The Second Benefit of Filing Sham Petitions: “Antitrust Immunity” 
 
 As illustrated in the cases above, activities aimed at manipulating the government 
process by brand-name manufacturers to eliminate competition and harm customers 
would seem to be the exact conduct the Sherman Antitrust Act was designed to 
prevent.
158
  However, courts have historically provided little relief to manufacturers 
attempting to protect their pending generic drug applications against delays caused by 
meritless citizen petitions.   Courts have generally held that filing these petitions is per se 
legal under the three Supreme Court cases that have come to be known as the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.
159
  This doctrine provides immunity for conduct aimed at 
persuading the government of a position even if the conduct interferes with competition; 
"such conduct is classic petitioning activity protected by the First Amendment and such 
actions may not be limited by the Sherman Act."
160
  However, this immunity is not 
absolute.  This section introduces the origins doctrine, describes some of the difficulties 
encountered by lower courts in applying the Noerr-Pennington sham exception corollary, 
and finally addresses the shortcomings that arise in the courts‟ current approach.   
 
A. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
 
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that liability under the Sherman Act cannot be premised on activities 
comprising “mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage and 
enforcement of laws”.
161
  In Noerr, a group of Pennsylvanian trucking companies alleged 
that several railroads and their public relations firms conspired to conduct a negative 
public relations campaign to encourage the passage of laws destructive to the trucking 
business as well as damage the existing relationships between truckers and their 
customers.
162
   
 
The Supreme Court held that these claims failed to state a cause of action based on two 
separate grounds.  First, the Sherman Act does not regulate political activity nor infringe 
on the concept of representation.
163
  Second, the Court determined that holding against 
the railroads “would raise important constitutional questions” about the right to petition 
the government.
164
  The Court emphasized that groups with a significant stake in the 
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passage of certain legislation often provide important information to Congress about 
issues in question.
165
  Whether the intent behind the petition was unethical or to harm 
competitors was irrelevant to the Court.  “The right of the people to inform their 
representatives in government of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement 
of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing so.  It is neither 
unusual nor illegal for people to seek action in the hope that they may bring about an 




In Noerr, the Court also laid the foundation for what is the only widely recognized 
exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity, the “sham exception”.  The Court stated that 
there may be petition activity that, although “ostensibly directed toward influencing 
governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.” 
167
 The 





Four years later, in the second of the Noerr-Pennington trilogy, the Supreme Court 
extended the Noerr protection beyond the legislative arena.  In United Mineworkers of 
American v. Pennington, the Court held that efforts directed at executive officials or 
governmental agencies are immune from antitrust liability.
169
  In Pennington, a mine 
workers‟ union and a group of large industry mines petitioned the Secretary of Labor and 
a federal agency to raise the minimum wage.
170
  The effect of the increase would squeeze 
out smaller firms that sold coal on the spot market.
171
 Reiterating that the party‟s intent 
under Noerr analysis is irrelevant, the Court held that “[j]oint efforts to influence public 




The Court rounded out the applicability of the doctrine in California Motor Transport 
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited by extending the doctrine to protect petitions to courts and 
administrative agencies from antitrust liability.
 173
 The Court also clarified that the 
immunity afforded by the doctrine is founded in the constitutional right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.
174
  Finally, the Court elaborated on Pennington’s 
dicta regarding limitations on the doctrine concerning sham petitioning.
175
   
 
In California Motor, a group of highway carriers alleged an antitrust conspiracy by a 
group of interstate carriers to institute state and federal proceedings, “with and without 
probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases”
176
 to defeat applications by the 
in-state carriers to acquire operating rights.
177
  The Court found that this type of conduct 
fell under the “sham” exception, which renders the Noerr-Pennington defense 
inapplicable.
178
 The Court determined “that a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may 
emerge which leads a fact finder to conclude that the administrative and judicial 
processes have been abused . . . effectively barring respondents from access to agencies 
and courts.”
179
   
 
The Court differentiated the exception‟s application in political and non-political 
arenas.
180
  The Court reasoned that while unethical conduct in political contexts is 
protected, “[t]here are many  . . . . forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may 
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corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust 
violations, misrepresentations condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when 
used in the adjudicatory process.”
181
   
  
Because of the Court‟s distinction, two separate rules were created to determine 
applicability of the sham exception.  For political matters, the sham doctrine applies to 
petitioning activity “not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable governmental action”.
182
  
In addition, a successful effort to influence the legislature is never a sham.
183
  While the 
Court did not specify precise parameters of the “sham” exception, it did identify several 
activities that might qualify.
184
  It took the Supreme Court over thirty years before it 
defined the test for the sham doctrine in the nonpolitical realm in Professional Real 
Estate Investors, Inc. v, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (“PRE”).
185
   
 
B. Sham Exception 
In PRE, the Court outlined the two-part test to determine when litigation is a sham and 
thus stripped of Noerr-Pennington immunity.
186
  First, the court must determine whether 
the lawsuit is “objectively baseless” in the sense that “no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits.”
187
  If the lawsuit is “reasonably calculated to 
elicit a favorable outcome”, the suit is immunized under the doctrine and the sham 
exception does not apply.
188
  Second, in addition to the suit being objectively baseless, 
courts must also consider the “litigant‟s subjective motive”.
189
  A lawsuit is a sham when 
it “conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor 





While the PRE Court sets forth a two-part sham litigation test, the majority‟s articulation 
of the “objectively baseless” component is faulted as being unclear.
191
  The majority first 
defined objectively baseless as one that “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect 
success on the merits.” 
192
  Later in the opinion, Justice Thomas likens the first prong to a 
determination as to whether a lawsuit is “without probable cause in the malicious 
prosecution sense.”
193
  In another part of the opinion, the Court refers to the language in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11 to define the standard.
194
  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Souter points out the inherent confusion contained in the majority‟s 
opinion.  He notes that whether “probable cause” exists is a different inquiry than 
whether a reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.
195
  Justices 
Stevens and O‟Connor also take exception to the majority‟ opinion for its “unnecessarily 
broad dicta.”
196
 Writing separately, they maintain “objectively baseless” should mean 
“objectively unreasonable.”
197
 A strong inference from these concurring opinions is that  
to the extent that the majority equates objectively baseless with lack of probable cause, 
the sham exception is unnecessary restricted.
198
 For example, applying the Court‟s 
current articulation of the first prong is to say that, a brand-name manufacturer‟s citizen 
petition maybe sufficiently weak to establish that there was no reasonable expectation of 
success, yet not so devoid of merit as to lack probable cause.    
 
Another problem created by the PRE sham exception is that the Court flatly refused to 
address how fraud or misrepresentation factored into a determination of the two steps of 
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the sham litigation test.  Unlike in California Motor, which implied that fraud could 
render the doctrine inapplicable, the PRE Court stated, “We need not decide whether, and 
if so, to what extent Noerr-Pennington permits the imposition of antitrust liability for a 
litigant‟s fraud or misrepresentation.”
199
    
 
Prior to PRE, federal courts were uniform in their application of the sham doctrine to 
strip Noerr-Pennington immunity from plaintiffs who made misrepresentations in non-
political forums.
200
 The PRE Court, however, called the rationale of these opinions into 
question.  As a result, courts‟ and administrative agencies‟ treatment of misrepresentation 
is inconsistent.  For example, the Ninth Circuit recognizes intentional misrepresentations 
as a subset of the sham doctrine when two criteria are met.  First, the misrepresentations 
must occur in the adjudicatory setting and second, they must “deprive the litigation of its 
legitimacy.”
201
  The Third Circuit has refused to recognize a distinct misrepresentation 
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, but does treat misrepresentation as a 
permutation of sham and applies a modified PRE test.
202
    The courts in this circuit 
inquire whether a petition is objectively baseless, “without regard to those facts that 
[were alleged to be] misrepresented”.  If it is determined that the misrepresentations “did 
not infect the core of the [petitioner‟s] claim and the government‟s resulting actions,” the 
petition is not objectively baseless and the sham exception will not apply.
203
 The FTC 
recognizes statements lose Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine outside the political 
arena provided they are misrepresentations or omissions that are (1) deliberate (not a 
mere error); (2) subject to factual verification; and (3) central to the outcome of the 
proceeding or case.
204
   
 
A major result of the Supreme Court‟s PRE decision is disparity among the lower courts‟ 
application of the sham exception‟s “objectively baseless requirement.”  Another result is 
the articulation of a standard that has failed to afford generic manufacturer‟s judicial 
relief in pursuing Section 2 Sherman violations.  An analysis of a recent case that showed 




C. What Should Have Been a Light at the End of the Tunnel . . .   
 
In Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, the court denied Louisiana 
Wholesale Drug Company‟s, (LWD) motion for a new trial after a jury concluded that 
Aventis Pharmaceutical‟s (Aventis) citizen petition was not objectively baseless and thus 
did not violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
206
   Aventis had 5 ½ years of exclusive 
marketing rights for the drug Arava in 10-milligram (mg), 20-mg, and 100-mg 
strengths.
207
  Arava is the branded version of leflunomide, a rheumatoid-arthritis drug.
208
  
On March 10, 2004, the day Aventis‟ patent expired, several generic wholesalers 
submitted ANDAs to the FDA seeking approval to market and sell generic equivalents of 
Arava.
209
  One year into the Agency‟s review of the ANDAs, and on the eve of their 




Aventis's petition raised bioequivalence and safety concerns.
211
  Specifically, Aventis 
requested that the FDA withhold final approval of any applicant's ANDA that did not 
seek approval of a 100mg leflunomide tablet that was bioequivalent to the Arava 100-mg 
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tablet or that failed to perform bioequivalence testing to confirm that five of its 20-mg 
tablets were bioequivalent to one 100 mg tablet.
212
  The petition also requested that an 
applicant failing to establish either of the above not be permitted either: (1) to label its 
product to permit the use of five 20 mg tablets as an alternative to the 100mg; or (2) to 
reference a 100mg tablet that the generic did not manufacture.
213
  The FDA denied the 
petition six months later and approved the ANDAs the same day.
214
  In denying the 
petition, the FDA noted that Aventis‟ requested relief that appeared to be “based on a 




LWD filed a suit on August 17, 2007, alleging that the citizen petition by Aventis was 
"objectively baseless" and submitted simply for the purpose of delaying generic 
competition, thereby preserving its ability to charge higher prices for Arava.
216
  Aventis 




In denying the defendant‟s motion, the court relied on California Motors to distill the 
issue.
218
  “The relevant issue is whether the legal challenges are brought pursuant to a 
policy of starting legal proceedings without regard for the merits [but rather] for the 
purpose of injuring a market rival.”
219
 The court relied on precedent that meritless 
petitions filed to impose delay and expense on a rival will subject a defendant to antitrust 
liability.
220
  The court went on to describe objectively baseless actions as “administrative 
or legal actions that do not request reasonable extensions or development of the law, as 
well as mischaracterization of the relevant issues or legal standards.”
221
  The court held 
that Aventis‟ petition would lose Noerr-Pennington immunity “if it had no reasonable 
chance of success and was directed at harming the generic manufacturer‟s interest in 




LWD alleged that Aventis‟ health and safety concerns were a sham intended to delay the 
entry and approval of generics drugs into the market.
223
  The FDA record showed that the 
primary concern raised in Aventis‟ citizen petition was that the ANDAs violated labeling 
regulations.
224
  Specifically, Aventis alleged that these applicants planned to cross-refer 
to other brands and strengths when they themselves did not manufacture either the drug 
or strength indicated.
225
  The FDA denied the petition in part because Aventis itself had 
used such cross-references in similar circumstances.
226
  In evaluating Aventis‟ motion to 
dismiss, the court noted in addition to the FDA findings, that the petition did not raise any 
new health or safety issues, or identify any new FDA regulations on labeling.
227
  The 
court found such deficiencies sufficient at the pleading stage to satisfy the sham 
exception and prevent dismissal of LWD‟s lawsuit.
228
  In elaborating on its sham 
exception analysis, the court determined that, as a sophisticated pharmaceutical 
manufacturer familiar with FDA regulations and practices, Aventis had no reasonable 
basis to believe its Citizen Petition was viable.
229
   
The court reiterated this reasoning when it denied Aventis‟ motion for summary 
judgment.
230
  The district court detailed how each of Aventis‟ three requests for relief 
contradicted FDA regulations and practice.
231
   The court concluded that the record made 
clear that Aventis was fully aware that neither law nor practice supported their claims.  
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As a result, the court held that genuine issues of fact existed regarding Aventis‟ objective 
basis for filing its petition. 
232
 
At a trial on the merits, the jury was instructed that its objectively baseless determination 
turned on whether “a reasonable pharmaceutical manufacturer could have realistically 
expected the FDA to grant the relief sought by Sanofi-Aventis in the citizen petition.”
233
   
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Aventis.
234
  LWD filed a motion for judgment as a 




The court denied both motions.  In denying LWD‟s request for a new trial, the court 
reviewed the jury‟s application of the sham exception to Aventis‟ conduct.
236
  Under the 
PRE inquiry the jury was charged with determining whether Aventis had probable cause 
to institute legal proceedings.
237
  The court noted that probable cause included “actions 
arguably warranted by existing law” and that “[e]ven in the absence of supporting 
authority” a litigant is “entitled to press a novel claim so long as a reasonable litigant 
could have perceived some likelihood of success.”
238
  The court could not find that the 
jury‟s conclusions were either “seriously erroneous” or the resulting verdict “a 
miscarriage of justice” sufficient to warrant a new trial.
239
    
 
 
IV. The Right Prescription 
The Louisiana Wholesale case illustrates the limitations in the judicial system‟s ability to 
adjudicate sham petition claims. These factors range from a conflicting “objectively 
baseless” standard to a jury‟s ability to parse through the data substantiating legitimate 
health and safety concerns.  To the extent that bad-faith actors can misuse the approval 
process for generic drugs, these actors have the power to hinder competition and reduce 
consumer access to lower-cost substitutes.  As noted by former Judge Robert Bork, “the 
modern profusion of . . . government authorities offers almost limitless possibilities for 
abuse,”
240
 and that “predation by abuse of governmental procedures . . . presents an 
increasingly dangerous threat to competition.”
 241
   He warns that sham litigation is a 
particularly effective method of predation.  Even when the petitions are unsuccessful, 
they can inflict substantial costs on a competitor and delay that competitor‟s entry into 
the market.
242
  What follows are recommendations to safeguard the process and thus the 
availability to consumers of lower-cost bioequivalent drugs. 
 
A. Two Parts Regulatory 
 
Safeguarding the citizen petition process requires additional regulatory reforms.  Section 
II of this Article outlines several questions left unanswered by the recently enacted 
FDAAA.  The Agency needs to define what constitutes a delaying petition.  Similar to 
the Agency‟s disposition of delaying petitions, the FDA should dismiss automatically 
petitions based on fraud and misrepresentations as well as serial petitions. In addition, the 
FDA should pursue criminal penalties for false or misleading petitions under the False 
Claims Act.
243
  The FDA should identify petitions dismissed under any of these 
categories as “objectively baseless”.  FDA determinations on citizen petitions are  
considered final and appealable in court.
244
 A strong argument exists that unless the FDA 
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determination is arbitrary or capricious, that the Agency‟s decision should be admissible 
to establish the objectively baseless criteria in a future violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Section Act allegation.
245
   
 
Abusing government processes will continue as long as there is no penalty for engaging 
in this type of conduct.  The FDA could discourage the most rampant abuse of sham 
petitions by exercising its discretion to refer unsuccessful citizen petitions that concern 
ANDAs to the FTC or Department of Justice.  In addition, the Citizen Petition Fairness 
and Accuracy Act of 2006 would have given the Department of Health and Human 
Services the power to sanction those who abuse the citizen petition process.
246
  Possible 
sanctions would have included a fine of up to one million dollars, a suspension or 
permanent revocation of the right of the violator to file future citizen petitions and a 
dismissal of the petition.
247
   
 
Adherence to the 180-day regulatory review requirement remains an area for 
improvement.  Unbundling the ANDA approval process from the process for review of 
other citizen petitions has improved efficiency.  In 2009, however, the FDA still did not 
complete all citizen petition reviews within the required 180 days.
248
 Stricter agency 
adherence to the regulatory timeframes would increase efficiency and decrease brand-
name manufacturers‟ ability to benefit from unofficial patent extensions due to delay 
incurred during the FDA review process.
249
   
 
The FDA can also improve the speed of its internal review process.  Rather than the 
current system of consecutive reviews by legal and scientific experts, the Agency could 
route a petition based on an initial determination as to whether it raised valid legal or 
scientific concerns.
250
  If the petition raised both legal and scientific issues, the FDA 
would forward the petition to the appropriate legal and scientific offices simultaneously 
to allow for parallel review of the concerns.
251
   
 
Another regulatory improvement would be for the FDA to impose a timeframe for citizen 
petition submissions.   Similar to the predefined comment period for citizens to respond 
to a proposed FDA rule, citizens would have a defined forty-five day comment period to 
raise health and safety concerns in response to ANDA applications.  This would avoid 
eleventh-hour petitions and enable the FDA to rule expeditiously and in time for an 
approved generic to go to market without an unjust delay.  These regulatory reforms 
aimed at eradicating delays in the approval of ANDAs due to sham petitions would 
decrease the incentives for brand-name companies to submit these petitions and help to 
safeguard the citizen petition process.  
  
B. One Part Adjudicatory 
 
A judicial approach to safeguarding the citizen petition process requires a blend of 
judicial deference and reformation of the PRE sham exception. Historically, courts afford 
deference to administrative agencies in the areas of interpreting congressional statutes.
252
  
The Supreme Court has held that agency actions are presumed valid and a plaintiff 
seeking to overcome that presumption has the burden of establishing invalidity.
253
   
 18 
 
That deference also extends to an agency‟s ability to formulate its own procedures.  It has 
long been held by courts that agencies have broad discretion in defining and applying 
rules for public participation in agency matters.
254
  The Supreme Court has established 
that courts must refrain from requiring procedural boundaries – even in cases when the 
proposed regulation would alter rights and obligations critical to the general public.
255
  
Courts defer entirely to the agency the determination as to what procedures are needed.
256
 
The FDA‟s broad authority is rooted in the belief that federal agencies are best suited to 
address the public‟s needs.
257
  Similar to the broad deference courts afford the FDA in 
establishing procedures for public involvement, federal courts generally defer to the FDA 
in lawsuits concerning scientific methodology for approving generic competitors.
258
   
Given the FDA‟s expertise, that deference seems justified.  
 
That sphere of deference extends to judicial review of agency factual determinations as 
well.  The APA requires courts to uphold factual determination rendered in informal 
proceeding unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion” and to 
review findings of fact in formal proceedings under a “substantial evidence” standard.
259
  
Pursuant to FDA regulations, citizen petition determinations, including “delaying 
petition” designations are final agency actions.  Neither the regulations nor the industry 
guidance identifies the standard of review for “delaying petitions.” However, the citizen 
petition review process is not set format.  A commissioner may use several different 
procedures in reviewing the petition including hearings, conferences, or any other 
applicable public procedure identified by the FDA.
260
  This process appears analogous to 
an informal proceeding.  As such, an argument exists that courts should review the 
Agency delaying determinations under the more deferential standard.  
 
Under the new regulations, the FDA makes the determination regarding whether a citizen 
petition qualifies as a “delaying petition.”
261
  As proposed in the previous section, the 
FDA should clarify that it bases this determination not only on the absence of a valid 
scientific or legal claim but also on a determination of the claim‟s reasonableness.    If a 
court finds that the FDA‟s determination was not arbitrary and capricious, then the 
Agency‟s determination should be admissible as satisfying the PRE sham exception 
requirement. Depending on how expansively the Agency interprets this new provision, 
the delaying petition designation could provide a vehicle to safeguard the integrity of the 
process by allowing the FDA to apply the “delaying petition” designation to claims that 
may have on their face raised a valid legal or scientific concern but after analysis were 
found to be shams.  This could be especially relevant in analyzing claims that include 
fraudulent or misleading concerns.  
 
If the Agency declines to adopt such an expansive application of the delaying petition 
provision, strengthening the deference courts afford to FDA determinations provides 
another mechanism to protect the integrity of the citizen petition process. The evaluation 
of citizen petitions that raise ANDA health and safety concerns involves a rigorous 
analysis of the scientific and legal claims by FDA staff including scientists, chemists, and 
attorneys.
262
   Based on their determinations, the FDA decides whether the claim has 
merit and warrants Agency action.
263
  During the citizen petition review process, parties 
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can submit additional information and amend their responses.
264
  Similar to the reasoning 
expressed above, at a minimum, courts uphold Agency findings of fact unless they are 
“unsupported by substantial evidence.”
265
 In subsequent antitrust lawsuits, proper 
deference to these FDA determinations could be determinative in meeting the first prong 
of the sham exception.  
 
The PRE standard for sham exceptions has been the subject of much scholarly ferment.
266
  
It is unlikely that this debate regarding the appropriateness of the exception‟s 
requirements will be resolved in the near future.  This Article supports the conclusion of 
other critics that the second prong – that of establishing subjective intent - is redundant 
and should be eliminated.
267
  In the alternative, this Article proposes a compromise.   
Arguably, in rendering delaying petition determinations, the FDA‟s citizen petition 
analysis of the petitioner‟s subjective intent to harm competition may not meet the PRE 
level of rigor. In those cases, it may be appropriate for juries to make those factual 
determinations.   As to the first prong however, the FDA‟s evaluation of the petition is 
rigorous enough to determine “objectively baseless” under either permutation of the 
standard. 
268
 Moreover, given the Agency‟s knowledge of the pharmaceutical industry 
and the ANDA process, a strong argument exists that the Agency, rather than a jury, is in 
a better position to make either determination. 
 
The history of judicial deference afforded administrative agencies and the recently 
enacted FDA regulations provide the foundation for a new approach to prevent brand-
name manufacturers from abusing government processes.  As noted above, the PRE sham 
exception has, so far, proven an ineffective tool to curb that type of conduct.   To recast 
the parameters of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its sham exception and to police 
bad-faith brand-name manufacturers would require a re-balancing, or at least a more 
nuanced balancing of the First Amendment and Sherman Antitrust Act.  History shows 
the Supreme Court is unlikely to take on such a task.  Instead, this Article suggests an 
approach that builds on existing FDA reforms and capitalizes on the relationship between 
the FDA and the court to safeguard the citizen process without having to wage that 
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